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  0ABSTRACT 
Although the literature converges regarding the reasons why and how networks of technology 
alliances are formed, there is still lack of agreement on what constitutes an optimal network 
structure, once it has been formed. The aim of this paper is to fill this void and to determine 
what constitutes an optimal network structure for exploration and exploitation. To study this, 
we differentiate among a firm’s direct ties, indirect ties and the redundancy among them. 
Analyzing their role in the pharmaceutical, chemical and automotive industry we show that 
the exploration-exploitation distinction forms an important factor for understanding a firm’s 
optimal network structure, and that the differences in network optimality between both tasks 
is one of degree. Moreover, we find that this differential role of a firm’s alliance network 
remains invariant across the three industries, enhancing the generalisability of the empirical 
results. Finally we discuss an important new insight that arises from some unexpected 
findings.   
 
  1INTRODUCTION 
  After well over a decade of study, consensus has grown in the academic literature that 
interfirm networks form an efficient mechanism to effectuate the potential for learning and 
innovation (Ahuja, 2000b; Grabher, 1993; Hagedoorn, 1993; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 
1994; Nooteboom 1999, 2004a; Powell et al. 1996; Rowley et al., 2000; Uzzi, 1997). 
Initially, research on strategic alliances has focused on the question of why and when 
alliances are formed (Duysters et al., 2001; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Powell and Brantley, 
1992). From this perspective the focus has been on the so-called exogenous factors that cause 
alliance formation, where interdependence and resource complementarities have been 
addressed as the most common explanation for firms forming inter-organizational ties 
(Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991, Gulati 1998). More recently, the 
strategic alliance literature has made progress in advancing our understanding of how inter-
alliance dynamics – the so-called endogenous factors - affect the intent of creating, building 
and sustaining collaborative advantage through alliance formation (for example Gulati, 
1995a, 1998; Walker et al., 1997; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Chung et al., 2000). This 
endogenous dynamic refers to with whom specifically alliances are formed (Gulati, 1995a; 
Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Taken together, the understanding of both exogenous and 
endogenous reasons of alliance formation has brought the insight to the fore that a firm’s 
embeddedness in networks matters for its economic and innovative action, and that it 
positively affects corporate performance in terms of growth (Powell et al. 1996), speed of 
innovation (Hagedoorn, 1993), organizational learning (Hamel, 1991) and reputation (Stuart, 
1998; Stuart et al., 1999). More specifically, it is not embeddedness per sé that leads to 
superior performance. Rather, network embeddedness brings both informational benefits and 
control benefits, which together form ‘social capital’ that a firm obtains from its network 
(Burt 1992a, Gulati 1995b). 
  2     Although  the  literature  converges  regarding the reasons why and how networks of 
technology alliances are formed, there is lack of agreement on what constitutes an optimal 
network structure, once it has been formed. This connects with a central debate in the 
network literature on how network structures facilitate the attainment of desired outcomes for 
its members. The key question here is whether networks should be sparse or dense, or put 
differently, whether ties should be redundant or non-redundant. On the one hand, there is the 
structural hole theory of Burt (1992a) which claims that firms can reap rents from the absence 
of ties among its contacts. According to Burt, there are costs associated with maintaining 
contacts and efficiency can be created in the network by shedding off redundant ties and 
selectively maintaining only a limited set of ties that bridge ‘structural holes’. This view is at 
odds with the social capital theory of Coleman (1988, 1990) who claims that firms benefit 
from cohesive (or redundant) ties with their alliance partners. According to Coleman, density 
(or ‘closure’) facilitates the role of social capital such as the build up of reputation, trust, 
social norms and social control.  
        In this debate, the empirical evidence is mixed. McEvily and Zaheer (1999) found 
evidence against redundancy in an advice network, for the acquisition of capabilities. Ahuja 
(2000a) found evidence against structural holes, for innovation in collaboration. Walker, 
Kogut and Shan (1997) found evidence in favour of cohesion, for innovation in 
biotechnology. In view of these apparently inconsistent findings, subsequent studies have 
taken a ‘contingency’ approach (Bae and Gargiulo, 2003), investigating environmental 
conditions that would favour one view over the other (Podolny and Baron 1997; Rowley, et 
al., 2000; Podolny 2001; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002).  
    In  fact,  this  apparently  contradictory evidence is not surprising. The opposite claims 
regarding the role of redundancy may well both be true as its value may vary in different 
settings or with different tasks or purposes (Burt 1998, Ahuja 2000b, Rowley et al., 2000). In 
  3this paper we argue that the distinction between exploration and exploitation forms an 
important contingency factor in explaining the differential value of redundant versus non-
redundant ties. Following March (1991), exploitation is associated with the refinement and 
extension of existing technologies and is needed for the short run. In contrast, exploration is 
concerned with the experimentation with new alternatives and is needed for the long run. As 
these tasks are profoundly different, we anticipate that the role of a firm’s alliance network 
will vary accordingly between both. Although there are numerous studies that have 
investigated the relationship between a firm’s portfolio of technology alliances and its 
(technological) performance (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Shan et al., 1994; Powell et 
al., 1996; Mitchell and Singh 1996; Stuart, 2000; Ahuja 2000a), there are only a few that 
have examined contextual factors such as the nature of the industry (Rowley et al., 2000) or 
the stage of industry development (Walker et al., 1997). However, none of these studies pays 
particular attention to how the tasks of exploitation and exploration are influenced by a firm’s 
alliance network. Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to improve our current 
understanding how a firm’s technological performance in terms of exploration and 
exploration is conditioned by the structure of its network of technology-based alliances.  
    In this way, we contribute to the literature along the following lines. One is that we identify 
in how far the distinction between exploration and exploitation matters for understanding a 
firm’s optimal network structure. Is has been elucidated in literature that the distinction bears 
relevance internal to the firm (March 1991, Levinthal and March 1993, Tushman  and 
Anderson 1996, He and Wong 2004), but the question is in how far it also does external to 
the firm. If it does, a second point is in how far a firm’s alliance network contributes 
differentially to exploration versus exploitation, in kind of effect and in magnitude of effect. 
Moreover, we also address if a firm can have ‘too many’ alliances. In other words, when does 
a firm’s network convey social capital and when does it become a liability (Gabbay and 
  4Zuckerman, 1998; Leenders and Gabbay, 1999). A further contribution lies in the fact that we 
study three different industries, namely pharmaceuticals, chemicals and automotive. These 
three industries are based on very different technologies (Breschi and Malerba, 1997) and 
reflect different industry recipes (Spender, 1989). At the same time, these industries share 
some important commonalities as well, such as the need to constantly invest in R&D and 
innovation-related activities (Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Mowery and Nelson, 1999; Coriat 
and Weinstein, 2003; McKelvey et al., 2004; Cesaroni et al., 2004). Given these differences 
and similarities, it will be interesting to see in how far the role of a firm’s alliance network 
will vary across these three industries, for exploration and exploitation. In this way, studying 
these three different industries enhances possibilities for generalization, which importantly 
complements the literature with its focus on single-industry studies (McEvily and Zaheer 
1999; Ahuja 2000a; Walker et al., 1997; Bae and Gargiulo 2003; Podolny and Baron 1997; 
Ahuja, 2000; Rowley et al. 2000; Podolny 2001; Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002; Gulati 
1995b).  
    This paper is structured as follows. First we elaborate our theoretical argument and 
formulate a number of hypotheses. Then, we present details about the data, the specification 
of variables, and the estimation method. Next, we present our main findings and a discussion 
of the results. Finally, we provide the main conclusions and some indications for further 
research.   
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 In this section we first discuss the difference between exploration and exploitation. Based on 
that we argue how a firm’s network structure may enhance or hamper both tasks.  
    The distinction between exploration and exploitation goes back to Holland (1975) and 
was later further developed by March (1991). Exploitation can be characterized as a process 
  5of routinisation, which adds to the existing knowledge base and competence set of firms 
without changing the nature of activities (March, 1991). As a consequence, exploitation can 
be planned and controlled for, which is important as competition has emerged and 
considerations of efficiency have become crucial. In contrast to exploitation, exploration can 
generally be characterized by breaking with an existing dominant design and a shift away 
from existing rules, norms, routines, activities and so on, in view of novel combinations. 
Hence exploration is not about efficiency of current activities and cannot be planned for. It is 
an uncertain process that deals with constantly searching for new opportunities. Returns from 
exploitation are positive, proximate and predictable. In contrast, returns from exploration are 
uncertain, more remote in time and organizationally more distant from the locus of action 
(Levinthal and March, 1993). Exploration and exploitation are related and build on each 
other: exploration develops into exploitation, and exploration emerges from exploitation, in 
ways that go beyond the present paper (see for a further discussion Gilsing and Nooteboom, 
2006).  
    Performing both tasks seems especially important for firms that operate in technology-
intensive industries. Given the high rate of change that generally characterises these 
industries (Hagedoorn, 1993), exploitation enables to recoup the (large) investments made in 
existing technology in a speedy manner. At the same time, these fast changing conditions 
make that existing technology may also obsolete rapidly and this then requires the timely 
creation and development of new technology. Therefore, we now further analyse how 
exploration and exploitation are conducted in such a technology-intensive environment, and 
how this is affected by a firm’s alliance network.  
 
In the case of exploitation, the focus of a firm is on strengthening its existing technology 
base. Firms maintain their existing scope and aim for refining insights with which they are 
  6already well familiar and for which they possess much of the required expertise (March, 
1991; Levinthal and March, 1993). Here the rationale for teaming up with partners is formed 
by possibilities to obtain complementary know-how (Teece, 1986) and/or to speed up the 
R&D-process in industries where time-to market is crucial. In-house technological 
capabilities guarantee that the objective of cooperation with alliance partners can be clearly 
defined, that the range of possible solutions is known and that the partners have a good 
understanding of the relevant issues at hand (Hansen et al., 2001). As a consequence, the 
cooperation process can to a large extent be planned and controlled for as targets can be set at 
the start. In this process, technology tends to become more explicit and codified (Nonaka, 
1994; Nooteboom, 2000) which furthers its diffusion among alliance partners, enhancing the 
efficiency and speed of cooperation (Gilsing, 2005).  
    Exploration of new technologies is different. It is not about improving the performance of 
current technologies and business, but it is about searching for new technologies and the 
potential business opportunities that can be derived from it. Alliances form an important 
instrument in this process, both for getting access to such novel knowledge (Freeman 1991, 
Ahuja 2000b) and for screening and evaluating it (Leonard-Barton 1984). Moreover, an 
alliance network brings together a variety of skills and experience, which provides a potential 
for the generation of Schumpeterian novel combinations (Schumpeter 1939). As such novelty 
entails issues and problems that are new to the company and to its partners, the newly 
obtained knowledge is usually contested, making it highly tacit and hard to articulate 
(Utterback, 1971; von Hippel, 1994; Nooteboom, 2000). This implies that the contact 
between partners will often be of a more iterative and informal nature with a focus on 
exchanging views and evaluating new ideas, leading to a need for rapidly changing strategy 
when unforeseen problems emerge (Gilsing, 2005). As a consequence, the process of 
collaboration and its outcomes cannot be predicted at the start, but rather forms an 
  7entrepreneurial search process that generates many dead ends and unexpected turns 
(Levinthal and March, 1993).  
        For both tasks, a firm’s alliance network plays an important role as the social capital 
derived from it complements a firm’s in-house capabilities (Rowley et al., 2000). However, 
given the marked differences between exploration and exploitation, we anticipate that the role 
of a firm’s alliance network will vary with both tasks. To study this in detail we suggest, in 
line with Ahuja (2000b), that there are three characteristics of a firm’s alliance network that 
should be analysed in detail, namely (1) the number of direct ties, (2) the number of indirect 
ties and (3) the degree of redundancy among these ties. More specifically, we argue that these 
three characteristics of an alliance network, apart and in combination, have a differential 
impact on exploration and exploitation tasks. 
 
Direct ties 
Direct ties take time to build up. Once a firm has formed a technology-based alliance with a 
partner, both have to start building a common understanding and developing routines for 
coordination and joint problem-solving. Once these investments are made, direct ties may 
provide different kinds of social capital: access to complementary knowledge and skills, 
possibilities to share risks and costs in research and the potential for bilateral trust-building 
between the focal firms (ego) and his partners. We anticipate that these elements of social 
capital will be relevant for both exploitation and exploration, although apparently more for 
the latter task than for the former. Let us further elaborate. 
    In exploitation, new knowledge creation is largely based on internal competencies. Here, 
knowledge and complementary skills of direct ties can be beneficial to a firm when these 
enable to improve its existing technologies and/or speed up its innovation process. In other 
words, technological similarity between ego and its direct partners is important for efficient 
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reliability and speed. So, here a focal firm looks for similarities with its alliance partners, 
rather than differences. In this way, direct ties may to some extent substitute for one another 
and adding more of them will not generate additional, valuable knowledge and skills. 
Moreover, direct ties may play a role in sharing costs and risks of research although these are 
generally limited in exploitation as the search process can largely be planned and controlled 
for (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993). Regarding the role of trust, it is known from 
the literature that a history of dyadic interactions provides a potential for the build up of trust 
between ego and each of his partners (Gulati, 1998; Hite and Hesterly, 2001; Roijakkers et 
al., 2005). However, the role of trust in exploitation may be limited for two reasons. One is 
the generally more codified nature of knowledge and the limited risk of unforeseen 
contingencies, which facilitate the specification of contracts as an alternative for trust 
(Nooteboom 2000). This potential role for contracts may become relevant given a risk of 
undesirable knowledge spillovers in exploitation. Here the codification of knowledge 
enhances its diffusion among partners, creating such a risk. This risk may be further 
reinforced by two mechanisms. The focal company is partnering with companies that are 
likely to have a similar technology profile, which facilitates the rapid absorption of such 
spillovers. Moreover, as competition is clearly present in exploitation, it is tempting for firms 
to look for such spillovers and in this way try to freeride on their partners’ efforts. As a 
consequence, putting too much faith in one’s direct partner(s) may not be sensible and 
contracts may form a way to compensate for this.  
     In  exploration  the  key  objective  is  to create novel combinations and achieving this 
requires access to a wide variety of knowledge and skills. Here a firm looks for differences 
across its direct ties, rather than similarities, as this provides the basis for diversity. In this 
way, more direct ties increase the potential for such novel combinations. Moreover, direct ties 
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exploration (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993). At the same time, the threat of 
leakage through spill-overs is limited as the more tacit nature of knowledge inhibits a rapid 
diffusion across its direct ties or throughout the wider network. This may enhance the build 
up of dyadic trust that again facilitates the exchange of such tacit knowledge, as its absorption 
requires intensive interaction over long(er) periods of time (von Hippel, 1988; Lundvall, 1992 
Hansen, 1999). In sum, this leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Past involvement in direct ties has a positive effect on exploration and  
 exploitation, but the effect for exploration is larger than for  
 exploitation. 
 
Over time, involvement in alliance activities through direct ties may lead to the build-up of a 
large alliance portfolio. This creates a risk of dealing with many unfamiliar streams of 
knowledge that are increasingly difficult to integrate (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). As a 
consequence, firms can start to suffer from information overload and diseconomies of scale. 
Moreover, management attention and integration costs may also grow exponentially once a 
certain optimal level of alliances has been established (Duysters and de Man, 2003). 
Therefore, at high levels of direct ties, marginal benefits of forming new linkages will be low 
and marginal costs of additional links will be relatively high (Ahuja, 2000a). As a 
consequence, an alliance portfolio with too many alliances may lead to saturation and 
overembeddedness (Kogut et al., 1992; Uzzi, 1997). Therefore, we expect an inverted-U 
shape relationship between a firm’s alliance network and both of its types of learning. Given 
the fact that a firm looks for similarities with its direct ties in view of exploitation, whereas 
nourishing differences in view of exploration, we expect that this risk of overembeddedness 
will set in earlier and also be stronger for exploitation when compared with exploration.  
  10As firms look for similarities with their partners in view of exploitation, this risk of 
overembeddedness will set in at relatively limited levels of direct ties. For exploration, a focal 
firm needs a larger number of direct ties in view of diversity, making this risk become real at 
relatively higher levels of direct ties and of a weaker degree when compared with 
exploitation. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  Past involvement in direct ties will, beyond a certain point, show 
  diminishing returns, but this effect sets in earlier and will be stronger  
  for exploitation than for exploration. 
          
Indirect ties 
Not only direct ties have an impact on the technological performance of partnering 
companies. Indirect ties also play a role because alliances can be a channel of communication 
between a focal firm and its indirect contacts, i.e. the partners of its partners, and so forth 
(Mizruchi, 1989; Haunschild, 1993; Gulati, 1995a). The distinction between direct and 
indirect ties is important because two companies that have the same number of direct contacts 
may still differ in terms of the number of companies they can reach indirectly, depending on 
the size and scope of their partners’ alliance networks (Gulati, 1999). A firm may have 
numerous alliances with partners that are not well connected to other companies. In contrast, 
another firm may have a limited number of alliance partners but, through them, be linked to a 
wide range of companies that have may alliances to others, and so forth. In other words, the 
social capital that a firm derives from its alliance network is not only determined by its direct 
ties but also by the number of indirect ties it can reach.  
Given this role of indirect ties, we argue that the impact of indirect ties on exploration 
is larger than on exploitation, for two reasons. First, if a firm can reach many other firms 
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research projects going on throughout the network (Ahuja, 2000a). In this way, indirect ties 
fulfill a ‘radar’ function for companies in the sense of bringing relevant technological 
developments to the attention of the focal firm (Freeman, 1991). Second, the tacit and 
experimental nature of exploration implies that firms will find it difficult to recognize and 
value the technology of potential partners when they are not connected through a common 
alliance partner. In this way, indirect ties can serve as a device for screening novel 
information on its potential relevance for the focal firm (Leonard-Barton, 1984). So, both for 
the identification of sources of novelty and for their initial assessment, indirect ties play an 
essential role. Given the importance of diversity and novel insights in exploration we expect 
this effect to be larger for exploration than for exploitation. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Indirect ties have a positive effect on exploration and exploitation,   
    but the effect for exploration is larger than for exploitation. 
 
Direct and indirect ties combined 
So, when looked upon apart, we claim that direct ties and indirect ties are beneficial for both 
tasks. By definition, direct ties serve as the bridge between the focal firm and its indirect ties. 
In other words, both ties operate in combination as well and should therefore also be 
considered jointly in their effect on exploration and exploitation.  
    As argued by Ahuja (2000a), firms that have many direct ties are likely to benefit less from 
their indirect ties than firms characterized by a more limited number of direct ties. There are 
two arguments for that. First, firms that have many direct ties are less likely to gain new or 
additional information from their indirect ties. In this case, the information that can be 
obtained from indirect ties may be very similar to the knowledge already obtained from its 
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potentially relevant information and may therefore benefit much more from the addition of 
indirect ties to their alliance network. A second argument is that firms with many direct ties 
may be more constrained in their ability to profit from new information through their indirect 
ties. From a management perspective, one can argue that having many direct ties consumes 
managerial attention at the expense of attention for indirect ties. Moreover, many direct ties 
increase the likelihood that the information reaching the company through its alliance 
network also reaches the partners of its direct ties, partners who may be potential competitors.  
    We argue that this logic regarding the combined effect of direct and indirect ties holds for 
exploitation but not for exploration. In exploitation, as we analyzed, the focal actor has much 
of the required expertise and is likely to understand the problem, the range of possible 
solutions and the causality among the key parameters (Hansen et al., 2001). In this case, the 
information gained from many direct ties will largely substitute for information from indirect 
ties. Moreover, as already argued, there is a threat of undesirable spillovers and the 
temptation for free-riding, implying that having many direct ties can be risky.  
    In contrast, in exploration a firm departs from its existing technology and searches for  
new insights. Such novelty emerges from making new combinations of the variety of 
knowledge and skills that reside within a firm’s alliance network. In effectuating this 
potential for new combinations, a firm’s direct and indirect ties play a complementary role. 
As they generally operate at a larger technological distance, indirect ties provide information 
that is novel to the focal firm but comes at a price of limited understandability for him. Direct 
ties will operate within closer vicinity of a focal firm’s knowledge and expertise. Through 
their intermediary role, they can complement a focal firm’s absorptive capacity through 
interpretation and evaluation of novel knowledge obtained from indirect ties. Moreover, as 
already mentioned, the threat of leakage through spillovers is limited due to the more tacit 
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differential role of direct ties in conditioning the effect of indirect ties on exploitation and 
exploration. Therefore we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The effect of indirect ties on exploitation is weakened by a firm’s direct  
ties, whereas the effect of indirect ties on exploration is enhanced by a firm’s  
direct ties.  
 
Redundancy among ties 
In our discussion on the role of direct ties, indirect ties and their combined effect we have 
abstracted from the degree to which these ties are redundant. As we argued, there is an 
ongoing debate in the academic literature about the impact of redundant and non-redundant 
network ties.  Burt (1992a, b, 2000) argues that social capital is derived from ties and from 
entrepreneurial opportunities to the extent that they offer access to non-redundant sources of 
information. In contrast, Coleman (1988, 1990) argues that companies can benefit from 
establishing alliances with companies that are densely tied to each other. Here, social capital 
consists of possibilities for social control, the functioning of an efficient reputation 
mechanism and the build up of trust and social norms. Following the central argument of this 
paper, we claim that the distinction between exploration and exploitation forms an important 
contingency factor in explaining which of the two views on social capital has (more) validity.  
    In exploitation, dominant designs have emerged, and technological and market uncertainty 
has decreased. Here, considerations of efficiency are crucial, since competition has arisen and 
will be (partly) based on price. Due to this increased competition on price, there is a need to 
utilise economies of scale, and this opportunity arises since due to decreased uncertainty on 
the part of customers the market has enlarged (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Afuah and 
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resulting concentration (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). In this process there is a strong drive 
for efficiency that requires the elimination of redundant relations. In other words, there is a 
requirement for a non-redundant structure. Moreover, the generally codified nature of 
knowledge furthers its diffusion, turning it into a collective asset that is shared throughout the 
industry (Breschi and Malerba, 1997). This enables a non-redundant structure, since now one 
can identify what competencies are and will remain relevant, who has those competencies, 
and who is likely to survive in the industry. Therefore, our fourth hypothesis reads as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Redundant ties have a negative effect on exploitation.  
 
In exploration, as already argued, firms need to create access to heterogeneous 
sources of knowledge. If we follow Burt’s argument here, this would imply that firms should 
engage in relations with non-redundant contacts, beyond their existing network, in order to 
access novel information (Burt, 1992a; 1992b; 1998). This is based on the (implicit) 
assumptions that firms know what kind of information is relevant and that the network 
positions of their partners, acting as sources of such novel information, remains unchanged, 
allowing for a rapid identification and access of such sources. Moreover, it is assumed that 
one has the absorptive capacity to absorb the novel information and to judge its quality and 
reliability. However, as we will argue, these assumptions do not apply when dealing with 
exploration tasks. Therefore, in contrast to Burt’s idea we anticipate that redundant ties play 
an important role in exploration. There are three reasons for that.  
    First is that in exploration, there is ample uncertainty regarding the content and reliability 
of newly emerging varieties of technology, and regarding the location and potential relevance 
of novel information (Levinthal and March, 1993; Argote and Ingram, 2000; Gilsing and 
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redundant, since it is generally very difficult to know what the future configuration of 
relevant elements of knowledge will be. Such problems in the identification of sources of 
information were recognised earlier by Argote and Ingram (2000) and Hagedoorn and 
Duysters (2002). To cope with such uncertainties, one has to hedge relational bets, because if 
one does not know what information will be relevant, one may have to develop and maintain 
redundant ties to sources that may turn out to be irrelevant later. Moreover, to hedge bets 
concerning the presence of sources, and the continuity of ties, one has to maintain linkages 
even if they may later turn out to be redundant, to keep options of access open.  
        A second argument in favor of redundant ties is that if one is not able to adequately 
understand novel information from a given source, one may need apparently redundant ties to 
complement one’s absorptive capacity (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005). More precisely, if A 
remains linked to both B and C, even if there is also a link between B and C, this may help A 
to understand C by comparing what A understands from C with what B understands from C. 
In other words, even if a tie is known to be redundant for access to sources of information, it 
may be needed to understand and absorb knowledge accessed in another relation. This is the 
case particularly in exploration, where new knowledge is emerging, and generally lacks a 
dominant design and standards and is still largely tacit. In addition, if one does understand a 
given source, one may not be able to judge the reliability of information, so that, like 
researchers in gathering potentially biased data, one may need a third party for triangulation. 
In this way, firms may be able to develop a richer understanding and a better evaluation of 
the acquired novelty. This connects with the argument from information theory that ‘noise’ is 
reduced when accessing multiple and redundant contacts (Shannon, 1957).  
  16    A final reason is that the costs of redundancy generally play a limited role in exploration as 
the key focus here is on finding and absorbing novelty, making considerations of efficiency 
less of an issue (March, 1991; Nooteboom and Gilsing, 2005).  
    In sum, when engaging in exploration tasks, we go against Burt’s argument in favor of 
non-redundant ties and follow Coleman’s view by arguing that redundant ties play an 
important role here. Hence, our final hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 5:  Redundant ties have a positive effect on exploration.  
 
Taken together, these hypotheses reflect our understanding of the differential effect of a 
firm’s alliance network on exploration and on exploitation. More specifically, hypothesis 1a, 
1b and 2 specify this differential role to be one of degree regarding the role of direct and 
indirect ties. Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 specify this role to be one of kind, in terms of opposed 
effects of the interaction between direct and indirect ties and of redundancy.  
 
DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODS 
 
Data 
The hypotheses were tested on a longitudinal dataset consisting of the alliance and 
patenting activities of 116 companies in the chemicals, automotive and pharmaceutical 
industries. The reason to choose these three industries is that they share the importance of 
investing in R&D and innovation, but that they also reveal profound differences regarding 
some key characteristics such as the stage of industry development (Walker et al., 1997), the 
importance of exploration vis-à-vis exploitation (Rowley et al., 2000) and the importance of 
product versus process innovations (Tidd et al, 1997). Pharmaceuticals with its invasion of 
biotechnologies reflects a younger type of industry that stresses the importance of exploration 
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more reliance on exploitation (Coriat and Weinstein, 2001). Moreover, the pharmaceutical 
industry has a strong focus on product innovations (Powell 1990, Walker et al., 1997), 
whereas chemicals show a strong focus on process innovations and the automotive industry a 
mixture of both (Marsili, 2001). Testing our hypotheses in such different industries enables 
us to assess in how far the role of a firm’s alliance network for exploration and exploitation 
remains invariant across industries, enhancing the generalizibility of the results. 
 The focal firms that we study were observed over a 12-year period, from 1986 until 
1997. The panel is unbalanced because of new start-ups and mergers and acquisitions. This 
sample was selected to include the largest companies in these three industries that were also 
establishing technology based strategic alliances. Alliance data were retrieved from the 
MERIT-CATI database, which contains information on nearly 15 thousands cooperative 
technology agreements and their ‘parent’ companies, covering the period 1970-1996 (see 
Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) for a further description). Information on the establishment 
of alliances is hard to obtain for small or privately owned companies. Previous studies on 
inter-firm alliances also focused on the industry leaders (Ahuja, 2000a; Gulati, 1995b; Gulati 
and Garguilo, 1999). 
In constructing variables based on past alliances, we have made two choices.  First, we 
have not considered different types of alliances separately and as a consequence, we have not 
weighed each type of alliance according to the ‘strength’ of the relationship as some authors did 
(see Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Gulati 1995b; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991. The second 
choice relates to the length of the period during which the existing alliance portfolio is likely to 
have an influence on the current technological performance of a company. The lifespan of 
alliances is assumed to be usually no more than five years (Kogut 1988, 1989). Therefore we 
have chosen for a moving window approach, in which alliances were aggregated over the five 
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1995b).  
Direct ties, indirect ties and network structure measures were calculated based on the 
adjacency matrices that were constructed from the MERIT-CATI database about R&D based 
inter-firm alliances. Since we assume an average life-span of 5 years for the technology 
alliances, an alliance matrix was constructed for each year per industry, counting all the 
technology-based alliances that were established by the firms during the five year period 
prior to the year of observation (of the dependent variable). 
In constructing the dependent variables, all patenting data were retrieved from the US 
Patent Office Database for all the companies in the sample, also those based outside the US. 
Working with U.S. patents – the largest patent market - is preferable to the use of several 
national patent systems “…to maintain consistency, reliability and comparability, as 
patenting systems across nations differ in the application of standards, system of granting 
patents, and value of protection granted” (Ahuja, 2000a; p. 434). Especially in industries 
where companies operate on an international or global scale U.S. patents may be a good 
proxy for companies’ worldwide innovative performance.  
    For  companies  in  the  three  sectors  the financial data came from a combination of 
Worldscope, Compustat and data published in the companies’ annual reports.  
 
Variables 
Dependent variables. The different hypotheses test in one way or another the effect that 
direct ties, indirect ties and redundancy have on exploitation and on exploration of different 
companies, in the chemical, automotive and pharmaceutical industry. To derive the two 
dependent variables, technological profiles of all focal companies were computed to find out 
whether new patents in the year of observation have to be categorized as ‘exploitative’ or 
  19‘explorative’. These technological profiles were created by adding up the number of patents a 
firm received in each patent class during the five years prior to the year of observation. 
Different scholars have argued that a moving window of 5 years is an appropriate timeframe 
for assessing the technological impact  of prior inventions (Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Stuart 
and Podolny, 1996; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Ahuja, 2000a). Studies about R&D 
depreciation (Griliches, 1979, 1984) suggest that knowledge capital depreciates sharply, 
losing most of its economic value within 5 years. The USPTO-classes were determined at 
two-digit level, which resulted in approximately 400 classes. 
From these technology profiles we can distinguish between exploitative and 
explorative technology classes. Classes in which a company receives a patent in the year of 
observation but had not received a patent in the previous five years were considered 
‘explorative’ patent classes
1. Since knowledge remains relatively new and unexplored for a 
firm immediately after patenting, patent classes kept their explorative ‘status’ for 3 
consecutive years, parallel to Ahuja and Lampert’s (2001) concept of novel and emerging 
technologies
2. All the classes in which a company had successfully applied for a patent the 
previous five years and successfully applied for a patent in the year of observation were 
considered ‘exploitative’ patent classes.  
The dependent variables ‘exploration patents’ and ‘exploitation patents’ were then 
made up by adding up all the patents applied for in the year of observation in the explorative 
and exploitative patent classes respectively.  
    Although the use of patents as an indicator of learning and innovative output has been 
criticized on many different ground (for an overview see Griliches, 1990) they are generally 
viewed as the single most appropriate measure of innovative performance at the company 
                                                 
1   We chose the year when the company filed for the patent rather than the year when it was granted, because 
the innovation in the company already has been realized when the company files for a patent. 
2   In order to test  the robustness of this measure, we also constructed a 'exploration patents'-variable where 
explorative patents could keep this status for 5 years instead of 3 years. 
  20level (Ahuja and Katila, 2001, Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002), in particular in a single 
industrial sector context (Basberg, 1987; Cohen and Levin, 1989, Ahuja and Katila, 2001). 
We must acknowledge that although patents are increasingly used as a proxy for learning it 
does not equate learning. In our view it is a proxy for the output of learning (knowledge stock 
increase). 
 
Independent variables. The impact of a firm’s alliance network on the innovative 
output of companies has been explored among others by Ahuja (2000a) and Ahuja and 
Lampert (2001). In this paper, innovative output of a company is split up into the exploration 
of existing technological capabilities and the exploitation of new technological fields. We 
have argued that the former task should benefit from redundancy in the focal firm’s network, 
while the latter task will be enhanced by the presence of structural holes (non-redundancy). 
For an accurate understanding of the impact of redundant and structural hole spanning 
alliances on both dimensions of innovative firm behavior, the firm’s ego network should be 
decomposed into distinct and separate elements. Following Ahuja, (2000a) we make a 
distinction between direct ties, indirect ties and the redundancy of ties in the technology 
based alliances network. These independent variables are calculated based on the alliances 
that were established during the 5 year period prior to the year of observation. 
 
Direct ties: The first dimension of a firm’s alliance network is ‘direct ties’. This 
variable is proxied by the number of allies to whom the focal firm is directly connected to 
(i.e., the size of the ego-network)
3. We also introduce the squared term of the number of 
alliance partners since hypothesis 1b suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
innovative performance and the number of direct ties.   
                                                 
3    Another possibility is to use the degree centrality of the focal firm (number of alliances between 
the focal firm and its alliance partners). 
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the number of partners it can reach indirectly in the alliance network. There are different 
possibilities to operationalize the breadth of coverage of indirect ties. We chose for a variable 
that measures the impact of indirect ties while taking into account the decline in tie strength 
across more distant ties. We only report the findings for the distance-weighted centrality (see 
tables 3a and 3b). We tested the robustness of the findings with other centrality measures that 
"...do not account for the weakening or decay in tie strength between firms that are connected 
by increasingly large path distances.” (Ahuja, 2000a: p. 438) and obtained similar results. 
"Distance weighted centrality”, is provided by Burt (1991). The variable “… attaches weights 
of the form 1 – (fi/(N+1)) to each tie, where fi is the total number of partners that can be 
reached up to and including the path distance i, and N is the total number of firms that can be 
reached by the focal firm in any number of steps” (Ahuja 2000a: p. 438). The result is that 
alliance partners receive smaller weights the longer the path distance to the focal firm. The 
“distance weighted centrality” can be calculated by adding up all alliances at several 
distances weighted by their path distances.  
Redundancy: The third dimension of a firm’s alliance network reflects the degree in 
which its ties are redundant. The literature offers several possibilities to operationalize the 
(non-)redundancy of alliances. Most – if not all – researchers who have been involved in 
empirical studies on inter-organizational networking, the role of social capital and the like 
have chosen for a single measure of redundancy (Burt, 1992a; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; 
Gulati, 1999; Ahuja, 2000a; Baum et al., 2000). In this paper, we develop different measures 
to formalize the notion of redundancy. We refer to Borgatti et al. (1998) for an extensive 
analysis of network measures that can be used to formalize the notion of redundancy.   
Burt (1992a, 1992b) argues that the two empirical conditions that indicate a structural hole 
(or non-redundancy) are cohesion and structural equivalence. Both conditions reveal that 
  22there are structural holes by indicating where they are absent. The cohesion criterion indicates 
that two partners of the focal firm “…are redundant to the extent that they are connected [to 
each other] by a strong relationship. A strong relationship indicates the absence of a structural 
hole.” (Burt, 1992b: p. 66). Structurally equivalent partners of the focal firm on the other 
hand have the same alliance connections to every other company in the network. Even in 
absence of an alliance between these two firms they will provide similar information to the 
focal firm because they are linked (directly and indirectly) to the same other companies in the 
overall alliance network. Thus cohesion focuses on the direct ties between a focal firm’s 
partners, structural equivalence concerns the indirect ties of a focal firm’s partners with more 
distant companies in the alliance network. In other words, cohesion based measures are based 
on the ego-network of a focal firm, structural equivalence based measures on the contrary are 
based on the position of the focal firm in the overall network. 
The first measure of redundancy, proportion density (Burt, 1983; Hansen, 1999), 
captures redundancy by cohesion indicating the presence of alliances between a focal firm’s 
allies. Alliance partners are redundant to the focal firm when alliances have been established 
between them. Proportion density is calculated as the number of ties in the ego-network of 
the focal firm (not counting ties involving the focal company) divided by the number of pairs 
where ‘pairs’ are potential ties. The values for this variable range from 0 to 1, where 1 
indicates that all allies are directly linked to each other. High values thus indicate high 
redundancy.    
Another variable to measure redundancy in terms of cohesion is “network efficiency” 
of a firm’s ego-network (Burt, 1992a: chap. 2). This is calculated by dividing the “effective 
size” (a variable measuring the number of non-redundant ties in a firm’s ego-network by 
subtracting the redundancy in the network from the number of partners the focal firm is 
connected to) by the number of partners in the firm’s ego-network. This efficiency ratio 
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redundant, down to a minimum approaching zero, indicating high contact redundancy and 
therefore low efficiency” (Burt, 1992a: p. 53).  
An additional variable capturing ego-network redundancy that Burt (1992a) offers is 
network constraint: this variable describes the extent to which a network is concentrated in 
redundant contacts. More constrained networks span fewer structural holes and, thus, we 
expect a positive impact of the ‘network constraint’-variable on exploration and a negative 
effect on exploitation.    
Apart from redundancy based on cohesion, redundancy can also be based on 
structural equivalence as argued by Burt (1992a, b). A variable that captures redundancy by 
structural equivalence is provided by Hansen (1999). He analyses the knowledge transfers 
between divisions within firms, but the idea can be easily transferred to interorganizational 
networks. Two alliances of the focal firm are structurally equivalent to one another when 
these two partners are connected to the same other firms in the (overall) alliance network 
apart from the alliances with the focal firm
4. Structural equivalence can then be calculated 
based on Euclidean distance or correlations. We choose correlations for the calculation of 
structural equivalence
5: we can calculate the similarity (pairwise correlation) of the patterns 
between pairs of firms in the alliance network. Thereby we exclude the alliances between the 
focal firm and its partners because we intend to measure the extent to which the alliance 
partners of the focal firm are connected to other firms in the overall network. Correlations are 
then converted into a redundancy measure by taking the average of the correlations between 
pairs of direct partners (allies) of the focal company. The values for this variable range from 
                                                 
4   Remark that redundancy measures based on structural equivalence take into account properties of the 
network structure that go beyond the characteristics of the ego-network of the focal firm. 
5   Faust and Romney (1985) have shown that Euclidean distance as a measure of similarity without proper 
attention to appropriate standardization procedures leads to biased results when the ego-network size of the 
focal firms differs considerably. This is not the case when structural equivalence is based on the similarity 
of the patterns between pairs of individuals, e.g. correlation. 
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measure ranging from 0 (low redundancy) to 100 (high redundancy). Following hypotheses 4 
and 5, we expect a positive sign when a company explores new technological fields and a 
negative sign when it exploits its existing technological capabilities.  
Control variables. While the primary focus of this study is to analyze the effect of a 
firm’s network structure on exploitation and exploration, there may also be other factors that 
affect the two dependent variables. We included three types of dummy variables. A first one 
variable indicates where the company is headquartered. Following the Triad-concept of the 
world economy, a company can be headquartered in North America, Asia or Europe - the 
default is Asia (Ohmae, 1985). Firms that are headquartered in different countries may differ 
in their propensity to patent. Annual dummy variables were included to capture changes over 
time in the propensity of companies to patent their innovations.  Finally, we included a 
dummy variable to indicate whether a company is a car manufacturer or chemical firm 
(default is the pharmaceutical industry).  
Furthermore, we intended to include three organizational variables as controls
6. The first 
one is the age of the company. Generally, one would expect older firms, with their accumulated 
experience, to be better at exploitation, and younger firms, with lower stakes and habituation in 
old technologies, to be better at exploration.    
Next, the natural logarithm of ‘corporate revenues’- a proxy for firm size - was included 
as a control variable. Firm size is expected to enhance exploitative learning (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1991). Large firms have the financial means and vast technological and other 
resources to invest heavily in R&D. However, they usually experience problems in 
diversifying into new technological areas inhibiting experimentation and favoring 
specialization along existing technological trajectories (Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 
                                                 
6   Those variables were calculated for the year prior to the year of observation. 
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advantage over small ones in exploiting technological dynamics with a cumulative nature, but 
that they may be at a disadvantage with respect to experimenting and exploring new 
technological fields. 
The other organizational variable is the natural logarithm of R&D expenditures. We 
expect a positive and significant coefficient in both regressions. Assuming that there exists a 
positive correlation between technological input and output (Pakes and Griliches, 1984) we 
expect that firms that invest heavily in R&D will have a higher rate of innovation. Also R&D 
investments play a role in the ability of companies to recognize, value and assimilate external 
knowledge. This absorptive capacity of companies is crucial to acquire and integrate external 
knowledge, especially when the knowledge is tacit. Firms conduct R&D to be more able to use 
the technology of other companies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kim, 1998; Mowery and Oxley, 
1995). This absorptive capacity argument is particularly relevant in the case of explorative 
learning because the knowledge to transfer is tacit and the focal firm has not yet built any 
capabilities in these technological areas.   
Technological diversity between the firm’s partners in the alliance network has to be 
introduced as another control variable according to Ahuja (2000a). His argument is twofold. 
First, if a firm’s allies are active in widely different technological fields, they may remain 
unconnected, generating structural holes in a focal firm’s alliance network. Next, if partners 
are highly heterogeneous in their technology base, collaboration is unlikely because they do 
not have the required absorptive capacity to learn from each other (Afuah, 2000; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Stuart, 1998). As a result, structural hole 
measures might reflect the negative impact of technological distance between its allies rather 
than social structural effects as postulated in hypotheses 4 and 5.   
  26Yao (2003) provides an interesting way to calculate the technological distance between a 
focal firm’s partners. “The knowledge distance among a firm’s direct alliances (excluding the 
firm itself) is the average distance among those firms. We take the sum of each dyadic 
distance between a firm’s direct contacts and divide the value by the total number of direct 
alliances of the firm. Since each pair of firms is counted twice, we also divide the value by 2 
to get the final technology distance among a firm’s alliance” (Yao, 2003: p. 12).  We refer to 
Yao (2003) for the calculation of the technological distance. 
 
Model estimation 
The two dependent variables are count variables and take only nonnegative integer values - 
i.e. the number of patents a firm filed for in a particular year in patent classes in which it has 
issued patents during the past 5 years (exploitative learning) and the other ones (explorative 
learning). A Poisson regression approach provides a natural baseline model for such data 
(Hausman et al., 1984; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). Since we use pooled cross-section 
data with several observations on the same firms at different points in time, we modeled the 
data using a random effects Poisson estimation
7. 











it λ λ −
= =         (1) 
Where the parameter λit represents the mean and the variance of the event count and yit the 
observed count variable. It is furthermore assumed that: 
 
λit =  β’xi t           (2)
 
                                                 
7   Hausman tests indicate that random effects Poisson models are better than fixed effects Poisson models. 
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The above specification assumes that the mean and variance of the event count are 
equal. However, for pooled cross-section count data the variance often exceeds the mean. 
This overdispersion is particularly relevant in the case of unobserved heterogeneity. The 
presence of overdispersion does not bias the regression coefficients but the computed 
standard errors in the Poisson regression are understated resulting in an overestimation of the 
the statistical significance of the coefficients.  Therefore, a random effects Poisson estimator 
used: it does not assume within-firm observational independence for the purpose of 
computing standard errors.  For the random effects Poisson estimator equation (2) is changed 
into: 
 
λit =  β’xit + ui          (3) 
 
where ui is a random effect for the i
th firm and reflects the firm-specific heterogeneity. 
Unobserved heterogeneity may be the result of differences between companies in 
their innovation generating capabilities, and as a consequence, also in their propensity or 
ability to patent. Such unobserved heterogeneity, if present and not controlled for, can lead to 
overdispersion in the data or serial correlation. The model accounts for unobserved firm-level 
heterogeneity as we included the sum of alliances that a firm entered in the last five years 
(moving window approach) as an additional variable to control for differences in firms' 
patenting behavior (Heckman and Borjas, 1980).  
Differences in patenting behavior between companies or between different years are 
further captured by including dummy variables in the model. First, the propensity to patent 
may be partly determined by the nationality of the companies or the industry to which they 
belong. Similarly, we introduced annual dummy variables to account for changes over time: 





Table 1 represents the description of the different variables. Table 2 provides the descriptive 
statistics and the correlations between the variables for the 662 observations in the sample. 
Although the sample represents the prominent firms in the three sectors, there is quite some 
variance on most of the key variables. The alliance network based measures such as indirect 
ties, direct ties and the different redundancy variables are not highly correlated with each 
other. However, there are high correlations between the size variable, R&D-expenditures (or 
even R&D intensity), ‘cumulative patents’, and the technological distance among the partners 
are highly correlated (not shown in Table 2). In order to avoid multicollinearity, we have 
looked for one (a) latent variable(s) by means of a factor analysis. The results indicate that 
cumulated patents, revenues and R&D expenditures form one latent variable (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.78). Factor scores were used as a new variable. The correlation between age and the 
latent variable is 0.30. The correlation between technological distance among partners and the 
latent variable is  –0.04.      
---------------------------------------------- 




Insert table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
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Tables 3a en 3b represent the results of the regression analysis using random-effects 
Poisson estimations respectively for exploitation and exploration. The basic model with only 
control variables is presented in model 1. There are no statistically significant differences 
between the three industries (chemical industry, car manufacturing and pharmaceutical 
industry) regarding the innovation rate both for exploitation and for exploration. The country 
of origin of the different companies plays a role in explaining both types of innovation. 
European companies have a lower innovation rate compared to Asian and US-based 
companies for exploitative patents. On the contrary, we do not find any significant 
differences between Asian, European and US-based companies regarding exploration. 
The latent variable capturing the effects of size (revenues, R&D expenditures, and 
patent portfolio size) is strongly and positively linked to exploitation by companies in these 
three industries. So, regarding the generation of exploitative patents, large companies that 
have built extensive patent portfolio's in the past have an advantage over firms that have not 
done so. In contrast, the size and technology portfolio of a company is not related to patenting 
in new patent classes (see table 3b). This finding is in line with the organizational learning 
literature: large established organizations have difficulties in diversifying into new 
technological areas, inhibiting experimentation and favoring specialization along existing 
technological trajectories (Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991; Ahuja and Lampert, 
2001). According to our results, small and large companies have a similar probability of 
patenting in new technology classes. Small firms can be as successful as large ones with 
respect to experimenting and exploring new technological fields.   
The age of companies has no impact on exploitation, but it is negatively related to 
exploration. In other words, older companies have more problems than younger ones to look 
beyond their existing technological portfolio.  
  30A last control variable is the technological distance between partners. Its effect on 
exploitation activities undertaken by firms is negative and significant, suggesting that further 
exploitation of existing technological capabilities is enhanced when a focal firm taps into the 
resources of partnering firms whose patent portfolio is not (too) different. In other words, in 
view of exploitation it is advantageous to carefully select alliance partners who have a similar 
technology profile. However, the same regressor has no significant effect on exploration. 
This indicates that linkages to partners with either different or similar technology profiles will 
not influence the innovation success of a company’s exploration activities.   
The estimated alpha coefficient is positive and significant for both exploitative and 
explorative learning. This indicates that important firm-level unobserved effects are present 
in the data and that a panel estimator is preferred above a pooled Poisson estimator.  
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Model 2 introduces direct ties and indirect ties as regressors. Direct ties are measured 
as the number of alliances a company established in the five previous years. Besides the 
linear term we also inserted the quadratic term to measure the impact of overembeddedness 
(Kogut et al., 1992; Uzzi, 1997). The coefficients for these variables are significant in both 
tables. This corroborates hypotheses 1a and 1b stating that direct ties are beneficial both for 
exploitation and for exploration, but that beyond a certain point the negative effects begin to 
dominate: embeddedness turns into overembeddedness. Moreover, the results on direct ties 
show that the coefficient of the linear term for exploitation is smaller than for exploration 
whereas the coefficient of the squared term is larger. This further confirms hypothesis 1b that 
  31the risk of overembeddedness sets in at lower levels of direct ties and is also stronger for 
exploitation than for exploration. The coefficients for the ‘indirect ties’ are positive and 
significant in both tables. The impact is substantially larger for exploration compared to 
exploitation. As a result, also hypothesis 2 is corroborated. Hence, a firm not only obtains 
social capital from its direct ties but also from its indirect ties. Moreover, the impact of 
indirect ties is substantially larger for exploration. The uncertainty involved in explorative 
research and the need to find novel knowledge pushes the focal firm to search also for 
solutions among the partners of its partners, or even beyond them. 
Model 2 also introduces an interaction term between direct and indirect ties and is an 
empirical test for hypothesis 3.  We have argued – following Ahuja (2000a) – that the number 
of direct ties moderates the impact of indirect ties, at least in the case of exploitative learning. 
This is supported by model 2 in table 3a. Because a focal firm has a good understanding of 
what type of knowledge is required and since the information involved is fairly explicit in 
exploitative learning, direct ties may easily overlap the knowledge that could be acquired 
from indirect contacts. However, the coefficient of this interaction term for exploration (table 
3b) is also negative and significant. This is in contrast with hypothesis 3. We argued that in 
the case of exploration, implying tacit knowledge and high levels of uncertainty, direct 
contacts would be beneficial to understand more distant, novel knowledge from indirect ties. 
Apparently, however, direct ties also moderate the need to have alliance partners with 
extensive networks of partners. To understand this further, we study the interaction between 
direct ties and indirect ties more in-depth. 
The joint impact of direct and indirect ties on both types of learning also differs 
considerably: according to model 2 companies can at best increase the patenting rate with 
18% (calculated at the average level of indirect ties) in the case of exploitative patents. In 
contrast, companies can improve the innovation rate with a maximum increase of 39% in the 
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‘distance weighted centrality drops to ‘10’, companies can improve performance with 39% in 
case of exploitation with 61% for exploration respectively
8. In fact, these results provide 
further support hypotheses 1a and 1b, which predicted a stronger effect of direct ties on 
explorative learning compared to exploitative learning. The difference is considerable, 
indicating that the impact of external acquisition of technological know-how through 
alliances is larger when companies are experimenting in new technological areas compared to 
exploitation.  
Returning to the role of direct ties, the maximum innovation performance is  reached 
at medium levels of direct ties – i.e. 15 alliances for exploitation and 28 alliances for 
exploration, calculated at the average level of indirect ties – indicating that 
overembeddedness may play a role at higher levels of direct ties, especially when a company 
engages in exploitation
9. However, these maximums increase significantly if the level of 
indirect ties drops: if the ‘distance weighted centrality drops to ‘10’, maximums are reached 
at 41 and 62 alliances respectively. Hence, when companies are not situated in the dense pack 
of the alliance network, they need more direct ties to reach the maximal innovation rate. In 
other words, there are different optimal strategies possible: firms can establish few alliances 
with partners that have extensive alliance networks with other firms, or alternatively, firms 
can partner with a larger set of companies who only maintain linkages to a few others. The 
results are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
                                                 
8   Since model 2 in tables 3 and 3b offers a saddle point solution, there is also a strong effect on innovation 
when the number of direct ties are limited and the number of indirect ties are high. Hence, allying with 
partners that are centrally located in the network improves the innovation rate of the focal firm both in 
terms of exploitation and exploration.     
9   These maxima are calculated from the first order conditions from model 2 in tables 3a and 3b at the mean 
value of indirect ties (=68.13): 
  Table 3a: x* = (12.1445 - 0.1184*68.31)/ (2*0.1339) ≈ 15 alliances 
  Table 3b: x* = (15.5020 – 0.1350*68.31)/(2*0.1140) ≈ 28 alliances 
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Models 3 to 6 allow us to test hypotheses 4 and 5. Each model introduces a variable 
that measures redundancy in a firm’s alliance network in a different way; three of them are 
based on cohesion and one on structural equivalence. Following hypothesis 4, we expect a 
negative effect from redundant ties on exploitation. Model 3 introduces ‘proportion density’ 
that measures the density of ties among a focal firm’s alliance partners and is thus a 
redundancy-measure. In line with hypothesis 4, our findings show such a negative effect. 
Model 4 introduces ‘network efficiency’ that measures non-redundancy within a firm’s ego-
network: high values for this variable indicate that a firm’s direct contacts provide non-
redundant information. Here we find a positive and significant coefficient in table 3a, which 
is also in line with hypothesis 4. Model 5 introduces ‘network constraint’ that forms a 
measure for redundancy again. The coefficient for this regressor is negative and significant, 
which again confirms hypothesis 4. Model 6 measures the effect of the variable that captures 
redundancy based on structural equivalence, forming a global measure that takes both direct 
and indirect ties into account. The calculation of structural equivalence is based on the 
correlation coefficient of every pair of profiles of the direct partners of the focal firm: high 
(low) values represent (non-)redundancy. In line with hypothesis 4, the impact of this 
variable on exploitation is negative and significant. Following these results of our four 
different measures of (non) redundancy, we may conclude that redundancy among a focal 
firm’s direct and indirect ties indeed form a liability when firms engage in exploitation 
activities.  
  34In comparison with exploitation, the results for exploration are less convincing. Three 
of our four measures have the right sign (proportion density (+), network efficiency (-) and 
SE-based correlation (+)), but none of them is significant. Moreover, network constraint not 
only lacks significance but also carries the wrong sign (negative instead of an anticipated 
positive sign). These results seem to indicate that, when engaging in exploration tasks, a firm 
benefits only from direct ties and indirect ties but that redundancy among these ties, or lack 
thereof, plays no role whatsoever.  
The  dependent variables was also  calculated in a slightly different way to test for 
robustness; Patents in new technology classes kept the status of an 'explorative patent' for 5 
years instead of 3 years. Even if exploitative and explorative patents were calculated this 
way, the results are very similar to those in tables 3a and 3b.  
 
 
 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main aim of this paper is to understand how a firm’s technological performance 
in terms of exploration and exploitation is conditioned by the structure of its network of 
technology-based alliances. To study this we have differentiated between a firm’s direct ties, 
indirect ties and the redundancy among them. We found that these three characteristics of an 
alliance network, apart and in combination, have a differential impact on exploration and 
exploitation tasks.  
The effect of direct ties and indirect ties is positive for both tasks, with the difference 
being that (for both types of ties) the effects are larger for exploration than for exploitation. 
Also the risk of overembeddedness could be identified for both tasks, whereby it sets in 
earlier and is stronger for exploitation than for exploration. Regarding the interaction between 
direct and indirect ties we found the expected, negative effect for exploitation but unexpected 
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effect of non-redundancy for exploitation was confirmed. In contrast, the predicted positive 
effect of redundant ties for exploration could not be confirmed, although not entirely rejected 
either. This leads to the following conclusions. 
First, these findings confirm the key claim of this paper that the distinction between 
exploration and exploitation forms a relevant contingency factor for understanding a firm’s 
optimal network structure. So, an important lesson here is that the distinction between 
exploration and exploitation is apparently not only relevant from a firm's internal perspective 
(March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993; Tushman and Anderson, 1996) but also from the 
perspective of its external alliance network. Second, the differential role of a firm’s alliance 
network is one of degree, and not of kind. In other words, optimal alliance networks for 
exploitation and exploration are not completely different but ‘only’ differ from each other to 
some degree. This is finding is important as it implies that a firm’s alliance network can be 
instrumental for both tasks and that one does not need a (completely) different type of 
network structure nor that investments made in building existing ties have to be made anew, 
for each task. Instead, one can use the same network for exploration and exploitation, if one 
takes the differential degree of the effect of one’s alliance network on the two tasks into 
account. Although we have to be cautious here regarding the effect of redundancy on 
exploration, an issue we will come back to.  
    A third conclusion is that we found no significant differences for the three industries that 
we studied, despite some of their key differences regarding innovation. Our findings indicate 
that the role of a firm’s alliance network for exploration and exploitation remains invariant 
across the three industries. This indicates that our choice to study three different types of 
industries has paid off as it enables us to generalize across them. Moreover, this implies that 
the distinction between exploration and exploitation seems to have larger explanatory 
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(Rowley et al., 2000), stage of industry development (Walker et al., 1997) or type of 
innovation (Tidd et al., 1997).  
    A fourth conclusion relates to the interaction between direct and indirect ties. We did not 
find evidence for our claim that the combination of direct ties and indirect ties has a positive 
effect on exploration. However, further analysis revealed that different strategies for 
combining direct and indirect ties can both yield optimal innovation output as has been 
illustrated in figures 1 and 2. Establishing a few direct ties with partners that have extensive 
alliance networks with other firms throughout the network leads to an innovation 
performance that is comparable to a strategy of partnering with a large number of firms who 
themselves are connected to only a few others. This insight nuances the dominant view in the 
literature that especially centrally positioned firms will show superior performance (Merton, 
1949; Burt, 1992b; 2000; 2004; Galaskiewicz, 1979; Krackhardt, 1990; Stuart, 1998; Gulati, 
1999; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). In contrast, our findings convey an optimistic message 
for firms occupying more peripheral positions. By investing in many direct ties with very 
limited ties themselves (in other words, few indirect ties are reached), a focal firm can obtain 
an innovation performance that is largely comparable to their centrally positioned 
counterparts. However, the price varies significantly between both strategies as peripheral 
firms have to absorb higher transaction costs (each tie entails set-up and maintenance costs) 
and face a greater risk of overembeddedness due to this large number of direct ties (following 
hypothesis 1b).   
    A final conclusion is that our study has not completely elucidated which view on the role 
of redundancy has more validity under which conditions. We have found clear empirical 
evidence in favor of Burt’s view when firms engage in exploitation tasks. His argument that 
shedding off redundant contacts creates efficiency in a firm’s network seems to form the 
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Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005). At the same time, we claimed an important role of redundant 
ties in exploration, in favor of Coleman’s view, which could not be confirmed. This 
seemingly implies that Coleman’s view on redundancy does not hold for exploration, but we 
think there is more to this. It is striking to see that two expected effects on exploration could 
not be identified, i.e. a rejection of a positive interaction between direct and direct ties and a 
lack of confirmation of a positive effect of redundancy. Apparently, the role of a firm’s 
alliance network in exploration cannot be entirely predicted based on arguments as advanced 
by the existing literature.  
    Implicit in most studies on the role of embeddedness is that it has been understood under 
conditions of relative environmental stability (Stuart, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and 
Garguilo, 1999; Ahuja, 2000b). It is under such ‘structure-reinforcing conditions’ (Madhavan 
et al., 1998) that the role of embeddedness is increasingly well understood, conditions that 
connect with March’s category of exploitation (1991). This leaves open how to understand 
the role of network embeddedness in view of exploration. Following our findings, it seems 
that the difference between an ‘embeddedness logic’ for exploitation versus exploration is 
one of degree, not of kind. On the other hand, others have shown that the role of redundant 
contacts differs profoundly between a setting that stresses efficiency versus one that 
emphasizes dynamics and learning (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2002; Nooteboom and Gilsing, 
2005). At this point, we suggest leaving these issues for future research.  
Other issues for future research and limitations of this study can be summarized as 
follows. We did not consider the effect 'tie strength' on exploitation and exploration. Different 
types of alliances can be weighted according to the ‘strength’ of the relationship as some authors 
did (see Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Gulati 1995b; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991). This 
would require additional research and hypothesis building regarding which alliance type is more 
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firm’s existing set of technologies. We suspect that tie strength will influence the role of direct 
ties and indirect ties as well as their interaction, but here we have chosen to abstract from this 
role as we first want to determine whether direct and indirect ties play a role in the first place. If 
so, a distinction between different types of alliances is likely to improve the analysis - as has 
been suggested in the context of ‘open innovation’ (Chesbrough, 2003) - but this is beyond the 
scope of the current paper. 
        Finally, exploration and exploitation have been operationalized in different ways in the 
literature (Benner and Tushman, 2002; Faems et al., 2005; Katila 2005; Katila and Ahuja 2002;  
Rosenkopf en Nerkar, 2001; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Rowley et al., 2000; Schildt et al., 
2005). Our definition of exploration and exploitation comes close to that of Benner and 
Tushman. However, none of these measures tries to transform the dichotomy between 
exploitation and exploration into a continuous variable measuring the degree of explorativeness. 
Entering a new patent class can be more or less explorative depending on the technological 
distance between a company's patent portfolio and the newly entered patent class(es) 
(Nooteboom 1999, 2000). This qualification may enrich the analysis of the balance between 
exploration and exploration considerably. 
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Definitions of dependent and independent variables 
 
 
Variable name  Variable description   
 
Exploitative learning  Number of patents a firm filed for in year t within patent classes in which is has been  dependent variable 
    active in the five years prior to the given year t   
Explorative learning  Number of patents a firm filed for in year t within patent classes in which is has not been  dependent variable 
    active in the five years prior to the given year t   
Cumulative patents  Number patents that a firm filed for during the previous five years (t-5 to t-1)   
(Cumulative patents)
2  Squared term of previous variable     
Indirect ties  ‘Distance weighted centrality’: Number of indirect ties but weighted to account for the decline in tie 
    strength across progressively distant ties 
Proportion density  Density of ties among a focal firm’s direct partners expressed as a proportion of all possible ties 
      between them in year t-1   
Network efficiency  ‘Effective size’ divided by the number of partners in the focal-firm’s ego-network (Burt, 1992a, p. 53)    
Network constraint  The extent to which a network is concentrated in redundant contacts (Burt 1992a) 
Network hierarchy  The extent to which the redundancy can be traced to a single contact in the network (Burt, 1992 a) 
Structural equival. (corr.)  Average correlation of every pair of profiles of the direct partners of the focal firm (Hansen, 1999)  
Age    The number of years since a company is founded in year t-1     
Latent variable  Factor scores based on ln sales, ln R&D expenditures and technological capital in year t-1 
Year   Dummy variable indicating a particular year (1986-1997)   
Chemical company  Dummy variable set to one if the firm is a chemical company 
Car manufacturer  Dummy variable set to one if the firm is a car manufacturer 
Europe  Dummy variable set to one if the firm is headquartered in Europe 
US    Dummy variable set to one if the firm is headquartered in the US 
 
 
Note:  All network variables are based on alliance network representing all the technology-based alliances that were established in an industry during the five years prior to 
year t 
  49TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 
Variable  Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14   
 
1  # of exploitative patents  102.23 156.81  0  1136    
2  # of explorative patents   9.19  14.92  0  125  0.24   
3  Direct ties  14.16  13.42  2   113  0.51 0.25   
4  Indirect ties  68.31  32.01  0  177  -0.12 0.03  -0.17 
5  Proportion density  14.60  23.10  0  100  -0.16 -0.09 -0.11 -0.15   
6  Network efficiency  0.884  0.167  0.1  1  0.15 0.08 0.05 0.16  -0.96 
7  Network constraint  0.224  0.181  0 1.125 -0.33 -0.19 -0.56 -0.11  0.51 -0.34 
8   Structural equival. (corr.)  0.152  0.193  -0.012  1 -0.12 -0.06  0.05 -0.22  0.92 -0.92  0.38   
9   Pattern partner sharing  0.314  0.143  0.003  0.5  0.07 0.08 0.18 0.30  -0.04 0.00  -0.22  -0.05   
10  Age 79.75  45.82  0  236  0.13  -0.06 0.12 0.01 0.02  -0.03  -0.05 0.05 0.04   
11  Latent variable  8.659  1.804  0.29 11.91 0.66 0.26 0.49  -0.11  -0.10 0.08  -0.28  -0.02 0.04 0.30   
12  Techn. distance partners  0.022  0.009  0  0.063  0.02  0.04 -0.11  0.27 -0.13  0.18 -0.01 -0.21 -0.06  0.05 -0.04   
13  Chemical company  0.376  0.458  0  1  0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.11  0.07 -0.07 -0.08  0.08 -0.10  0.16  0.11 -0.17   
14  Car manufacturer  0.270  0.444  0  1  0.05 0.03 0.25  -0.33 0.13  -0.20 0.11 0.20 0.07 0.04 0.21  -0.15  -0.47   
15  Firm is European  0.233  0.423  0  1  -0.26 -0.02  0.01 -0.11  0.13 -0.18 -0.07  0.18 -0.05 -0.07 -0.16 -0.14  0.11  0.13 
16  Firm is US-based  0.429  0.495  0  1  0.04  0.01 -0.02  0.17 -0.18  0.20 -0.06 -0.23  0.01 -0.05 -0.04  0.17 -0.14 -0.18 
17 Year  1986  0.081 0.273  0  1 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.27  0.05 -0.04  0.10  0.08 -0.26 -0.05 -0.04  0.00  0.01 -0.00 
18 Year  1987  0.087 0.282  0  1 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.26  0.04 -0.04  0.07  0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00  0.03 
19 Year  1988  0.081 0.273  0  1  0.00  0.01 -0.03 -0.09  0.07 -0.06  0.03  0.05  0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02  0.01 
20 Year  1989  0.081 0.273  0  1  0.01  0.02 -0.00 -0.03  0.05 -0.04 -0.01  0.02  0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.01 -0.00 
21 Year  1990  0.087 0.282  0  1 -0.01  -0.03 0.02  -0.01 0.03  -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01  -0.02  -0.09  -0.00 0.01 
22 Year  1991    0.087 0.282  0  1 -0.01  -0.04 0.00  -0.00  -0.05 0.05  -0.00  -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01  -0.00 0.01 
23 Year  1992  0.082 0.275  0  1  0.01 -0.07 -0.00  0.02 -0.07  0.06 -0.02 -0.06  0.14  0.04  0.02 -0.02 -0.00  0.01 
24 Year  1993  0.084 0.277  0  1  0.00  -0.07 0.00 0.01  -0.05 0.05  -0.02  -0.04  -0.17 0.04 0.02 0.02  -0.01 0.01 
25 Year  1994  0.081 0.273  0  1  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10  -0.05 0.05  -0.03  -0.04  -0.20 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.00  -0.00 
26 Year  1995  0.082 0.275  0  1  0.05 0.15 0.02 0.09  -0.01 0.01  -0.03  -0.03 0.10  -0.00 0.03 0.04 0.01  -0.02 
27 Year  1996  0.082 0.275  0  1 -0.00  0.07  0.05  0.17 -0.00 -0.00 -0.06 -0.02  0.04 -0.00 -0.02  0.04  0.02 -0.02 
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Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (continued) 
 
 
Variable  15  16  17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26     
 
15  Firm is European   
16  Firm is US-based  -0.48   
17 Year  1986  0.03 -0.02   
18 Year  1987  0.01 -0.02 -0.09   
19 Year  1988  -0.02 0.01  -0.08  -0.09   
20   Year 1989  -0.01  0.00  -0.08 -0.09 -0.08   
21 Year  1990  -0.00  -0.01  -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09   
22 Year  1991    -0.02  0.01  -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10   
23 Year  1992  -0.01  -0.00  -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09   
24 Year  1993  -0.02  0.00  -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09   
25 Year  1994  -0.02  0.01  -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09   
26 Year  1995  0.02  -0.00  -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09   




  51TABLE 3a 
Determinants of the patent rate of firms – Exploitation, 1986-1997 
 
 
  Variable    Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6   
Direct ties 
Cumulative alliances /1000     12.1445*** 11.8128*** 12.3351*** 6.3301***  12.7228***  
       (1.2178) (1.2183) (1.2209) (1.3395) (1.2274) 
(Cumulative alliances/1000)
2      -0.1339*** -0.1312*** -0.1349*** -0.0954*** -0.1362*** 
       (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0103) (0.0097)  
Indirect ties 
Distance  weighted  centrality      0.0020*** 0.0018*** 0.0020*** 0.0012*** 0.0020***  
       (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003)  
((Distance  weighted  centrality)         -0.1184*** -0.1131*** -0.1185*** -0.0979*** -0.1183***  
 *  (cumulative  alliances))/1000    (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0053) (0.0093)  
Structural holes vs. network closure 
 Via cohesion 
Proportion  density      -0.1175***     
        (0.0385)   
Network  efficiency       0.1171** 
         (0.0558) 
Network  constraint        -5.8519*** 
          (0.5770) 
Via structural equivalence 
Correlation (Hansen)   -0.1585***   
   (0.0412)   
Control variables 
Car  manufacturer    0.2240 0.1384 0.1992 0.1475 0.1348 0.1506  
     (0.3931) (0.3803) (0.3836) (0.3792) (0.3747) (0.3791)  
Chemical  industry    0.6108 0.5069 0.5176 0.5072 0.4871 0.5112  
     (0.4088) (0.3888) (0.3877) (0.3875) (0.3829) (0.3875) 
Europe    -1.5788*** -1.4280*** -1.4661*** -1.4182*** -1.4255*** -1.4173*** 
     (0.4391) (0.4173) (0.4198) (0.4162) (0.4104) (0.4161)  
   52 
US      -0.0914 -0.0352 -0.0611 -0.0334 -0.0268 -0.0329 
     (0.3575) (0.3449) (0.3462) (0.3438) (0.3401) (0.3437) 
Age      0.0031 0.0021 0.0016 0.0021 0.0020 0.0021 
     (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.040)  (0.0039) (0.0040) 
Factor  (Firm  size,    #  patents    0.4311*** 0.6636*** 0.6667*** 0.6671*** 0.6766*** 0.6630*** 
  R&D intensity)     (0.0206)  (0.0276)  (0.0276) (0.0277) (0.0275) (0.0276) 
Techn. distance    -3.8682***  -2.6439***  -2.8607*** -2.8234*** -2.0338*** -3.0092*** 
 between  partners    (0.7261) (0.7420) (0.7416) (0.7465) (0.7503) (0.7472) 
Constant    3.8368*** 3.6954*** 3.7768*** 3.5878*** 3.8983*** 3.7067*** 
     (0.4644) (0.4440) (0.4486) (0.4455) (0.4382) (0.4424) 
 
alpha    1.7263***†  1.6000*** 1.5785*** 1.5895*** 1.5539*** 1.5888*** 
     (0.2518) (0.2362) (0.2353) (0.2349) (0.2304) (0.2347) 
 
Number  of  firms    74 74 73 74 74 74 
Number  of  firms-years    662 662 655 662 662 662    
Wald  chi-squared    1343.24 1657.32 1632.59 1662.12 1762.86 1671.69 
      
 
Notes:   Standard error between brackets 
***   p  < 0.01;  **   p  < 0.05;  *   p  < 0.10  
‘Year dummy variable’-coefficients are not reported in the table. 
The models use a random effects Poisson estimator. The sample is an unbalanced panel. 
† Significance of the likelihood test of alpha = 0. High significance indicates that the panel estimator is preferred over the pooled estimator.     
 53 
TABLE 3b 
Determinants of the patent rate of firms – Exploration, 1986-1997 
 
 
  Variable    Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6   
Direct ties 
Cumulative alliances/1000       15.5020*** 14.5247*** 15.5406*** 14.2272*** 15.48569***   
       (4.9709) (5.0049) (4.9773) (5.4507) (4.9736)  
(Cumulative alliances/1000)
2      -0.1140** -0.1047** -0.1139** -0.1038** -0.1142**  
       (0.0449) (0.0451) (0.0449) (0.0482) (0.0449)  
Indirect ties 
Distance  weighted  centrality      0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0034*** 0.0035*** 0.0037*** 
       (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)  
((Distance  weighted  centrality)         -0.1350*** -0.1284*** -0.1212*** -0.1309*** -0.1364***  
 *  (cumulative  alliances))/1000    (0.0391) (0.0395) (0.0385) (0.0398) (0.0392)  
Structural holes vs. Network closure 
 Via cohesion 
Proportion  density      0.13792 
        (0.0994) 
Network  efficiency       -0.2028 
         (0.1405) 
Network  constraint        -0.0827   
          (0.1462)) 
Via structural equivalence 
Correlation (Hansen)   0.0819 
           ( 0 . 1 1 0 2 )  
Control variables 
Car manufacturer    -0.1649  -0.1495  -0.1226 -0.1713 -0.1472 -0.1582 
     (0.3138) (0.3180) (0.3306) (0.3207) (0.3175) (0.3187) 
 Chemical industry    -0.1224  -0.0923 -0.0876 -0.1042 -0.0937 -0.0967 
     (0.3228) (0.3287) (0.3304) (0.3309) (0.3280) (0.3294) 
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  Europe    -0.4064 -0.5221 -0.5523 -0.5267 -0.5181 -0.5282 
     (0.3676) (0.3687) (0.3803) (0.3713) (0.3680) (0.3695) 
US      -0.3525 -0.4025 -0.4188 -0.4019 -0.4008 -0.4047 
     (0.2865) (0.2898) (0.2983) (0.2918) (0.2894) (0.2903) 
Age     -0.0065**  -0.0078***  -0.0080*** -0.0078*** -0.0078*** -0.0078*** 
     (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Factor  (Firm  size,  #  patents,   0.0610 0.0975 0.0921 0.0978 0.0960 0.0989 
 R&D  intensity)    (0.0580) (0.0671) (0.0664) (0.0669) (0.0671) (0.0672) 
Techn. distance    -1.2734  -1.8148 -1.9670 -1.5180 -1.7512 -1.5882 
 between  partners    (2.2508) (2.2879) (2.2897) (2.2987) (2.2932) (2.3092) 
Constant    2.8328***†  2.6524*** 2.6720*** 2.8355*** 2.6833*** 2.6437*** 
     (0.3296) (0.3368) (0.3482) (0.3618) (0.3409) (0.3375) 
 
alpha    1.0505*** 1.0500*** 1.0828*** 1.1064*** 1.0469*** 1.0539***  
     (0.1665) (0.1681) (0.1741) (0.1702) (0.1677) (0.1687) 
 
Number  of  firms    74 74 73 74 74 74  
Number  of  firms-years    662 662 655 662 662 662 
Wald  chi-squared    232.76 252.50 250.26 254.43 252.92 252.94 
  
 
Notes:   Standard error between brackets  
***   p  < 0.01;  **   p  < 0.05;  *   p  < 0.10  
‘Year dummy variable’-coefficients are not reported in the table. 
The models use a random effects Poisson estimator. The sample is an unbalanced panel.  
  † Significance of the likelihood test of alpha = 0. High significance indicates that the panel estimator is preferred over the pooled estimator.  Figure 1: The innovation rate for different levels of direct and 
indirect ties – exploitation 
 

















Figure 2: The innovation rate for different levels of direct and 
indirect ties – exploration 
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